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Abstract
It is commonly posited that for-profit, nonprofit, and other government vendors have funda-
mental differences, which make one or the other the superior choice depending on the circum-
stances of service delivery. Past research, focusing on service and market characteristics, finds 
support for this proposition. In this article, we investigate not only the typical theoretical expec-
tations regarding vendor traits, service characteristics, and market conditions associated with 
the sectors, but also the presumed trustworthiness and management practices that are argued 
to differentiate them in an effort to better understand the roles played by each in local govern-
ment contracting. Our findings indicate that as expected, nonprofits are most commonly em-
ployed when dealing with hard to define, “soft” services with weak markets. However, contrary 
to expectations, nonprofits are not generally considered more trustworthy than for-profits and 
are not managed more “loosely” (i.e., more ambiguous contracts, more discretion exercised in 
sanctioning) than their for-profit peers. Rather, public vendors seem to be the most trusted and 
are managed less rigidly than contractors from the other sectors.
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It is common in the local government contracting literature to argue that sector matters; that is, 
to posit that for-profit, nonprofit, and other governmet vendors have fundamental differences, 
which make one or the other the superior choice depending on the circumstances of service 
delivery. Scholars adopt various theoretical frameworks to explain vendor preference in con-
tracting. Public choice theorists generally favor for-profit firms for improving efficiency and 
promoting innovation in local service delivery (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; Savas, 1987). A key 
to the successful use of for-profit vendors is for local governments to become “smart buyers” 
(Kettl, 1993) so as to reap the benefits that markets offer (Savas, 2000). For-profit vendors are 
deemed less ideal when competitive markets do not exist (Kettl, 1993). In addition, transaction 
cost economics suggests that the benefits gained from using for-profit vendors can be diminished 
when services are difficult to define and vendor performance is challenging to assess (Brown & 
Potoski, 2003a; Ferris & Graddy, 1986; Lamothe & Lamothe, 2006; Lamothe, Lamothe, & 
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA on January 20, 2016arp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
710  American Review of Public Administration 43(6)
Feiock, 2008). Nonprofits and other governments are favored in these circumstances as the non-
distributive legal constraints to which they are subject and the publicness embedded in these 
types of organizations promote their faithfulness as contracting agents (Brown & Potoski, 2003a; 
Hefetz & Warner, 2012; Stein, 1990). Furthermore, other government contractors are also appeal-
ing where economies of scale can be achieved and equity can be promoted through public market 
solutions (Bel & Fageda, 2006; Warner, 2006; Warner & Hebdon, 2001).
Nonprofits seem to be preferred over the other sectors for the delivery of social services 
(Ferris & Graddy, 1986). Government failure theory (Weisbrod, 1988) contends that nonprofit 
organizations are suitable choices for providing human services that benefit groups with rela-
tively narrowly defined needs or preferences in community settings (see also similar discus-
sions from Bellah, Madson, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985; Berger & Neuhaus, 1977; Smith 
& Lipsky, 1993). Nonprofits are also argued to have comparative advantages over the govern-
ment and market for delivering services to socially undesirable groups because their actions are 
less restrained by ownership-driven accountability (i.e., preferences of voters and shareholders; 
Billis & Glennerster, 1998). While the literature on vendor preference mainly focuses on pro-
curement (i.e., choosing vendors once principal governments decide to buy services), recent 
scholarly efforts extend inquiries into examining whether there are sectoral differences in man-
aging and overseeing contracts as well (Amirkhanyan, 2010; Andrew & Entwistle, 2010; 
Marvel & Marvel, 2007, 2008, 2009). Again, theory separates nonprofit and other government 
contractors from their for-profit counterparts and generally predicts that principal governments 
treat these two presumably more trustworthy vendor types with less oversight and more 
discretion.
The main purpose of our study is to comprehensively examine the validity of these existing 
claims about vendor ownership in contracting. In so doing, we investigate not only the typical 
theoretical expectations regarding vendor traits, service characteristics, and market conditions 
associated with the sectors, but also the presumed trustworthiness and management practices that 
are argued to differentiate them. Examining vendor ownership in a multivariate environment, 
including a direct test of the sector-based trust assumption, is important because there is a pos-
sibility that not all posited factors are coherently and independently identified with one or the 
other sectors. Recent empirical findings suggest this possibility by reporting no meaningful dif-
ferences between nonprofits and for-profits on several dimensions (for example, Andrews & 
Entwistle, [2010] find them nondifferentiable on performance; Amirkhanyan, [2010, p. 750] 
reports that public managers “unequivocally reject the proposition that ownership matters”;1 
Lamothe & Lamothe, [2010] find no difference regarding adherence to contract terms). To com-
prehensively investigate sector differentiation, we administer our own survey of local jurisdic-
tions that deliver hard and soft services through outsourcing and use multinomial logit to estimate 
the model.
Our findings suggest a significant gap between theory and practice in our understanding of 
vendor ownership and related managerial behaviors. Public managers do have differing percep-
tions about nonprofit and for-profit vendors in terms of their community ties, the characteristics 
of the services they deliver, and the competitiveness of the markets in which they operate. Such 
segregation, however, does not seem to extend to the degree of trust they display toward them, 
nor to lead to differential treatment regarding writing contracts and enforcing sanctions in the 
occurrence of noncompliance. Interestingly, this is not the case when local jurisdictions rely on 
their neighboring governments to deliver services—principal governments seem to trust their 
public vendors more so than private vendors and consequently use only minimal safeguards 
when preparing and managing such contracts. Below we discuss the theoretical expectations 
regarding vendor ownership, develop hypotheses and report the findings from our model. We 
conclude by reviewing the implications of our findings.
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA on January 20, 2016arp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Lamothe and Lamothe 711
Theoretical Expectations Concerning Vendor Ownership
Vendor Traits
Scholars derive core differences among the sectors based on their legal and organizational foun-
dations because these frameworks provide essential clues as to the general goals and account-
ability structures of vendor organizations.
Trust. Both public choice theorists and transaction costs analysts argue that the sectoral differ-
ences posited between nonprofit and other government vendors and their for-profit counterparts 
originate from the different legal and organizational boundaries within which these sectors oper-
ate; specifically, nonprofits and governments are not allowed to distribute profits to owners or 
shareholders. Scholars often argue that the inability of nonprofits and public organizations to 
transfer surpluses to private interests makes them more trustworthy contracting partners because 
they have fewer incentives to cut corners or participate in other opportunistic behaviors to the 
detriment of principal governments (Brown, Potoski, & Van Slyke, 2006). Besides the legal limi-
tations, the supposed trustworthiness of these two sectors as contract agents can be traced to the 
notion that government workers (Brewer & Selden, 1998; Rainey, 1982) and nonprofit employ-
ees (Leete, 2006; Light, 2004) are more publicly minded than their for-profit peers; that is, they 
are more likely to have joined their organizations in pursuance of contributing to the public good 
rather than simply in search of personal gain. Taken together, the literature recognizes nonprofit 
and public organizations as inherently more trustworthy than for-profit firms.
Scholars further distinguish other governments from nonprofits as particularly reliable and 
credible contracting partners for local governments (Andrew & Entwistle, 2010; Stein, 1990; 
Warner & Hefetz, 2002). Although nonprofit and other government vendors are argued to share 
such similarities as nondistributive legal constraints, public-minded personnel, and mission- 
oriented behavior, other government contractors are set apart from nonprofit organizations in 
that as public units, they share the same organizational characteristics and are subject to the same 
political scrutiny that contracting governments face (Brown 2008; Marvel & Marvel, 2007; 
Stein, 1990; Van Slyke, 2003) and thus are considered to be inherently more publicly account-
able, even when there is minimal to no monitoring by principal governments. A deeper level of 
conviction as to why other government contractors are unlikely to be opportunistic also comes 
from the fact that governments, in general, have more stable revenue sources (for example, 
through taxes and fees) to maintain their financial security than nonprofits who “may enter ser-
vice markets for fiscal survival” (Brown, 2008, p. 368). Amirkhanyan (2010, p. 747) reports how 
local administrators perceive nonprofit contractors to be as “fiscally aggressive” as their for-
profit counterparts to protect their bottom lines even while they see nonprofits’ missions being 
more generally aligned with those of contracting governments.
In sum, we expect that local governments consider other governments as the most trustworthy 
contracting partners (H1) while trusting nonprofits more than their for-profit counterparts in 
terms of fulfilling contractual obligations without engaging in opportunism (H2).
Community ties. Unlike the presumed trustworthiness shared by nonprofit and other govern-
ment contractors, the concept of “community ties” appears to be uniquely associated with the 
former type of vendors. Nonprofits’ strong connections to the communities are frequently recog-
nized among scholars. As such, Smith and Lipsky (1993, p. 22) call them “manifestations of 
community” as local volunteers often make up large portions of nonprofit workforces as well as 
their governing boards (Boris & Steuerle, 2006; Smith & Lipsky, 1993; Worth, 2009). Other 
scholars point out the long history of community-based nonprofit organizations delivering 
human services in the absence of government intervention (Salamon, 1995; Young, 2006). When 
“government became an active participant in the provision of human services . . . service provi-
sion was typically accomplished via contracting with these existing [nonprofit] agencies” (Sclar, 
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2000, p. 125; see also Smith & Lipsky, 1993 for a similar narrative). It should be noted that 
claiming close associations to the communities they serve is not entirely monopolized by non-
profit organizations as private business traces its philanthropic roots back to the 19th century in 
the form of community-based charitable contributions (Hall, 1989; Young, 2006). Nonetheless, 
we expect that nonprofits distinguish themselves as holding much stronger ties to the communi-
ties than for-profit or other government vendors (H3).
Service Environments
Above, we discuss how vendors’ legal and organizational characteristics and internal gover-
nance structures tend to spawn varying degrees of trustworthiness by sector. These are internal 
attributes closely related to the ownership status of vendors. The literature also identifies exter-
nal conditions that separate vendors. These conditions are closely related to the characteristics 
of the services each sector produces and the market and political environments to which they are 
often subject.
Risks associated with services. Scholars frequently employ Williamson’s (1985) measurement 
difficulties and asset specificity dimensions based on the transaction costs economics (TCE) 
framework to characterize the nature of services (Brown & Potoski, 2003a, 2005; Ferris & 
Graddy, 1991; Lamothe et al., 2008). By theory, for-profit firms are preferred for hard services 
that are easy to define, measure, and monitor while nonprofits and public vendors are favored for 
soft types whose tasks are ambiguous and performance is difficult to evaluate. Theory also 
chooses the latter types of vendors for delivering services that have the potential for “hold up” 
(Levin & Tadelis, 2010) where incumbents are advantaged by investment in specific assets or 
because of the need to customize service delivery. Contract failure theorists predict an increase 
in “both the incentive and opportunity to take advantage of customers” (Hansmann, 1987, p. 29) 
if these types of services are provided by for-profit firms (see also Moe, 1996; Steinberg, 2006 
for discussions of contract failure theory). For-profits might also have incentives to limit access 
(Ferris & Graddy, 1986). For example, in social services they might engage in “cream skim-
ming” in an effort to avoid cases that would require high resource commitments or have low 
probabilities of success (Smith & Lipsky, 1993). Nonprofits lack this motivation and may con-
centrate their resources on delivering quality products. In fact, Schlesinger and Gray (2006) 
report nonprofit hospitals being consistently more accessible to unprofitable clients and non-
profit nursing homes providing better care to vulnerable populations who do not have vocal 
advocates representing their interests.
Likewise, other government vendors as soft service deliverers enjoy the same perception of 
embedded faithfulness and quality, but also are regarded as particularly reliable vendors that 
ensure “continuity and stability of services” to the constituents of contracting governments, 
which is an important priority public managers pursue (Andrew & Entwistle, 2010, p. 681). 
Unlike nonprofit service providers, however, other governments are likely choices for easily 
measurable hard services as well when only limited numbers of private vendors are available and 
using public markets through multijurisdictional cooperation is an option to achieve economies 
of scale (Bel & Fageda, 2006; Warner & Hebdon, 2001).
As a result, we expect that nonprofits are most likely to be associated with challenging-to-assess 
and highly asset-specific soft services (H4). Public vendors may deliver a mixture of hard and soft 
services for the reasons discussed above and, hence, while we expect public contractors to more 
closely associated with these types of services, the separation between governmental and for-profit 
vendors might not be as pronounced as the difference between nonprofits and for-profits (H5).
Service market conditions. Public choice theorists and privatization advocates argue that the 
injection of market-like discipline into public service delivery systems will lead to an increase in 
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efficiency and consumer choice (Dunleavy & Hood, 1994; Hood, 1991; Savas, 2000). Competi-
tion is the key underlying theoretical condition to be met to make this assertion plausible because 
it is competition that forces potentially self-interested and profit-seeking vendors to be respon-
sive to buyers’ preferences and bid close to their true production costs to win contracts (DeHoog, 
1984; Kettl, 1993). In the presence of competition, for-profit firms are favorite choices for ser-
vice delivery because of their strong incentives to be efficient (Savas, 1987, 2000). Unfortu-
nately, failure to form competitive and viable markets commonly occurs in quasi-market systems 
(Hirsch, 1991; Lowery, 1998). Competition is especially lacking in human service contracting 
(DeHoog, 1984; Lamothe & Lamothe, 2009; Sclar, 2000; Smith & Lipsky, 1993; Van Slyke, 
2003) and is considered counterproductive when services require integrated delivery systems 
(Milward & Provan, 2000). Nonprofits are natural fits for these types of markets. As discussed 
in the previous section, limited private markets are also likely to lead to public market utilization, 
especially with regard to small and rural municipalities relying on county governments to deliver 
needed services (Warner & Hebdon, 2001). We thusly predict a nexus between limited vendor 
markets and nonprofit and other government contractors while expecting for-profit vendors to be 
more commonly associated with competitive markets (H6).
Citizen interest in services. Some services are likely of more concern to citizens than others. For 
example, the average resident probably cares more about the quality and quantity of police ser-
vices in his/her jurisdiction than how public parking lots are managed. This reality may affect the 
behavior of public managers, for as Bartels (1991, p. 457) puts it: “[t]he appeal of representative 
democracy hinges on the responsiveness of elected politicians to the preferences and interests of 
their constituents.” This logic applies to appointed managers as well, as they serve at the pleasure 
of their elected bosses. Prescribing to this line of reasoning, public management scholars argue 
that government administrators will try to maintain as much command as possible over such 
services. Levin and Tadelis (2010) find that “sensitive” services are more likely to be produced 
in-house than through contractual arrangements and argue this is because “cities want control 
over [such] services” (529). Similarly, Hefetz, and Warner (2012) posit that when services of 
particular interest to constituents are outsourced, public or nonprofit vendors, as opposed to for-
profits, should be the contractors of choice owing to communities having more influence with 
such entities. They find some support for this assertion—for-profit contracting is less likely for 
those services that public managers deem to be of greatest relevance to the residents of their 
jurisdictions. Based on the above, we hypothesize that services that are deemed to be of high 
interest to citizens should be more commonly contracted to other government and nonprofit 
vendors, and less likely to use for-profit entities (H7).
Contract Features and Management Styles
The contracting literature largely focuses on initial vendor selection when examining ownership 
differences (Brown & Potoski, 2003a; Hefetz & Warner, 2012; Lamothe et al., 2008). More 
recently, researchers have turned their attention to examining whether ownership matters in 
managing vendors once they are recruited. Scholarly concerns are centered on the types and 
intensity of oversight directed toward vendors (Amirkhanyan 2010; Marvel & Marvel, 2007, 
2008, 2009). Marvel and Marvel (2009, p. 189) argue that high-powered incentives and sanc-
tions such as monetary awards and penalties, as well as contract extension and suspension, are 
suitable for “managing contracts with market-driven firms” to promote efficiency and keep the 
behavior of profit-seeking agents in-line with the goals of principals. Adhering only to monetary 
and other material incentives and penalties to control agents, however, may result in suboptimal 
achievement since, while “what gets measured gets done” (Marvel & Marvel, 2009, p. 187), 
principal governments’ policy goals can easily be compromised given the informational asymmetries 
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favoring agents (Heckman, Heinrich, & Smith, 2002; Heinrich, 2007; Holmstrom & Milgrom, 
1991). Marvel and Marvel (2009) also contend that such high-powered management strategies 
are less transferable and less effective when applied to nonprofit and other government contrac-
tors as they may serve as a hindrance to long-term, cooperative relationship building processes 
based on trust. Stewardship theory argues that adopting low-powered, nonmonetary incentives 
such as informal discussions, technical assistance, and public recognition/reprimand are suffi-
cient to keep these types of vendors controlled and to elicit quality performance (Marvel & 
Marvel, 2009; Van Slyke, 2007).
Regarding sectoral differences as to the extent of oversight, Marvel and Marvel (2007) report 
that governments tend to monitor substantially less when outsourcing to public and nonprofit 
agents while supervising more intensely when using their own employees or dealing with for-
profit contractors. They explain that the lack of oversight for public vendors might be because 
governments simply transfer quality control responsibilities to fellow governmental units whom 
they trust to perform their own internal monitoring. Other scholars offer similar arguments as to 
auditing advantages (Van Slyke, 2003) and deference in monitoring (Lamothe & Lamothe, 2010) 
when using public vendors.
Marvel and Marvel (2007) argue that strong goal congruence exists between governments and 
nonprofits and contend that such mission alignment potentially results in insufficient monitoring 
of nonprofit contractors. However, recent empirical findings are more nuanced in terms of non-
profit—for-profit differences. For example, Amirkhanyan (2010) reports no perceptual differ-
ences between these two vendor types when public managers are asked about whether ownership 
matters to them in managing contracts. What appears to set them apart is not so much their sec-
tors or origin, per se, but the nature of the services they deliver. It may not be that monitoring 
intensity varies by vendor type so much as there might be variance in the methods of monitoring 
owing to the characteristics of the services (e.g., hard service monitoring may make greater 
use of measurable indicators, whereas soft service monitoring might be more qualitative and 
process-oriented in nature).
Based on these discussions, we anticipate post procurement management and oversight activi-
ties to differ for public and private vendors, not only because of their differing legal and organiza-
tional characteristics, but also owing to the fact that public entities share similar political and 
managerial traits. Specifically, we predict generally lower levels of administrative controls in both 
ex ante and ex post oversight activities when governments rely on public vendors (H8). We do not 
expect this to be the case when governments contract out to nonprofit or for-profit vendors, although 
managerial controls might be less intensive when involving the former type of vendors (H9).
Data Collection and Research Design
To assist us in testing the differences between for-profit, nonprofit, and other government ven-
dors, we conducted a survey through the purchase of a contact list of 2,000 jurisdictions from 
the International City/County Management Association (ICMA). ICMA’s database contains 
contact information for approximately 10,300 municipalities and counties in the United States. 
Of these, 1,519 governmental units have populations of 50,000 or greater (660 cities and 859 
counties) and 8,751 governmental units have populations of less than 50,000. So as to maximize 
our chances of gathering a good mix of vendor types, we chose to limit our sample to only those 
jurisdictions with populations of 25,000 or more, for as Levin and Tadelis (2010) find, larger 
jurisdictions are more likely to provide a wider array of services through a variety of arrange-
ments. Surveys were sent to each unit in our sample during January of 2010 with reminder 
postcards sent in early February. Toward the end of February, we sent the survey package to all 
nonresponding jurisdictions in the hopes of receiving additional responses.2
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We asked each respondent to answer questions for two services of their choosing that they 
deliver through contracted arrangements—one from a list of hard services and one from a list of 
soft services, as defined by ICMA’s classifications of public works/transportation and health and 
human services, respectively (see Appendix A for the lists). The bulk of our questions take the 
form of 5-point, ordered scales where respondents are asked to mark the point between two 
opposing statements that they feel most accurately represents their beliefs or the circumstances 
of their jurisdictions with regard to the specific contract in question. For example, to ascertain 
competitiveness of the vendor market, respondents were asked to choose between 1 = There are 
many vendors in the market available to replace the incumbent to 5 = There are very few vendors 
in the market to replace the incumbent (please see Appendix B, which defines the codings of the 
variables used in the analysis, for the verbiage for each of the queries).3 As such, each jurisdic-
tion can show up in our data two times, with each case representing a specific government- 
service pair.
In the end, we received responses from 359 jurisdictions, for a response rate of 18.0%.4 Of the 
responding jurisdictions, 69 indicate they do not contract for either type of service and 17 include 
no suitable information. In addition, some cases are missing data on variables relevant to our 
analyses. Because of these limitations, the number of jurisdictions included in our model is 248. 
As we ask for information on two services, the maximum number of cases possible is 496. 
However, many jurisdictions only reported information for one service (most commonly the hard 
service), usually indicating they do not contract for the other type. So, in the end, number of 
cases included in our analysis is 335 (with a total of 215 hard and 120 soft service cases).
As with any sample, there are questions as to the representativeness of our data. Turning to 
Appendix C, we see that our dataset vastly oversamples jurisdictions with larger populations. As 
mentioned above, this is by design. However, it still has implications for the generalizability of 
this study. Our data are dominated by jurisdictions in the 50,000 to 249,999 population range, 
which is not representative of the overall distribution of municipalities in the country. Thus, our 
findings are more relevant to such midrange to larger jurisdictions. Our findings may not trans-
late well to small jurisdictions (especially those with populations under 10,000). We also under-
sample north central and oversample western jurisdictions. It is not clear what, if any, implications 
there are for interpreting our results, but readers should be aware of this concern. Finally, as 
always seems to be the case with ICMA-related data, council-manager forms of government are 
overrepresented. This could call into question the generalizability of our findings as there might 
be reason to believe that professional managers’ perceptions of contracting environments might 
vary systematically from elected public officials owing to differing educational backgrounds and 
career expectations and pressures.5 Having described our data collection process, we now turn to 
describing the measurement of the variables in our model and the analytic technique employed.
Variable Measurement
Our dependent variable, Vendor type, is a categorical measure that identifies for-profits, non-
profits, and other governments. When discussing our independent variables, unless otherwise 
stated, all are 5-point ordered with the variable descriptions explaining what the high scores 
indicate (readers are directed to Appendix B for a more comprehensive review of the codings of 
all variables included in the analysis).
Trust measures the extent to which the vendor is perceived to fit the following description: 
“We trust this vendor to fulfill its obligations even when it is not being watched.” Community ties 
accounts for how strongly grounded in the community contractors are perceived to be. 
Measurement difficulty is an additive composite of two 5-point indicators (alpha = 0.798) captur-
ing the difficulty associated with defining service tasks and performance measures. Asset 
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specificity is Brown and Potoski’s (2003a) measure (see also Carr, LeRoux, & Shrestha, 2009) 
and accounts for the extent to which service production requires specialized investment of assets. 
Few vendors denotes the competitiveness of the service market (i.e., are there too few potential 
vendors?). Citizen interest is borrowed from Hefetz and Warner (2012) and captures not only 
how concerned citizens are with the quality of the service delivery, but also how interested they 
are in the process as well.
We tap into how contracts are managed through the use of three variables. Contract features 
is the sum of three 5-point measures (alpha = 0.753) that determine if contracts are generally not 
rebid unless the incumbent has problems, deliverables are ambiguous, and the contract lacks 
explicit sanction clauses. Contacts and coordination summarizes if such activities are common 
during the contract implementation phase. The last variable, Use of discretion in sanctioning, 
measures if “negotiation often takes place without formal sanctioning and contract terms may be 
altered as a result.” In all cases, it is our expectation that public vendors will be associated with 
the most lax styles of management and for-profits the most stringent. Nonprofits should hold a 
middle ground. Therefore, as high scores on both Contract features and Use of discretion in 
sanctioning represent less rigid approaches, other government contractors should be associated 
with higher scores on these variables while for-profits should tend toward lower values, with 
nonprofits falling somewhere between. However, high scores on Contacts and coordination rep-
resent active, “hand-on” management, leading us to posit that high scores should indicate for-
profit contracting, low scores other governments, and, once again, middling scores pointing 
toward nonprofits.
We also include a series of control variables, not previously discussed. Professional adminis-
trator is dichotomous and codes one if the jurisdiction uses a council-manager form of govern-
ment, which may be associated with higher levels of capacity (Brown & Potoski, 2003b) and 
professionalism. This, in turn, might systematically impact how jurisdictions match services and 
vendors. Jurisdiction size is accounted for by including the census estimate for the population in 
2008 (Population, 2008). We feel this variable is needed because larger jurisdictions should have 
a greater selection of vendors and types of vendors to choose from than their smaller counter-
parts. We also control for level of government through the use of a dummy variable identifying 
counties, as it seems likely that counties should be less likely to contract with other governments 
than smaller jurisdictions that are trying to achieve economies of scale. Furthermore, county 
governments may also be more likely to contract with nonprofits as this level of government is 
often highly involved in the delivery of social services. Finally, Performance indicates that “this 
vendor has been performing very much above expectations.” While it is important to include this 
measure as it might be related to other aspects that differentiate between vendors, such as levels 
of trust, it also is serves as a rudimentary test of the proposition than specific sectors are associ-
ated with superior performance. See Table 1 for the descriptive statistics for all of the variables 
included in the analysis (please note that the dependent variable, Vendor type, is broken down 
into its dichotomous components, for-profit, nonprofit, and other government, for the sake of this 
Table).
As our dependent variable is categorical, multinomial logit6 is an appropriate choice for esti-
mation.7 Taken together, the above lead to the following equation:






 Community ties + b
3
 Measurement difficulty + b
4
  
Asset specificity + b
5
 Few vendors + b
6
 Citizen Interest + b
7
 Contract features + b
8
  
Contacts and coordination + b
9
 Use of discretion in sanctioning + b
10
  
Professional administrator + b
11





 Performance + e.
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Results
The results of our analysis are located in Table 2. Overall, the model fit is good with the chi-
squared statistic significant at less than one percent and a proportional reduction in error of 
26.3%.8
Overall, the results suggest that a higher level of trust and laissez-faire management styles are 
likely to be associated with government contractors while nonprofit and for-profit vendors are 
not significantly differentiated on either dimension. A particularly striking difference between 
governmental and private vendors is that public managers seem to use few ex ante control mech-
anisms when outsourcing services to fellow government agencies. That is, their contract docu-
ments tend to be more vaguely written with fewer specifics about deliverables, performance 
measures, or sanctions. This is not the case when governments write contracts with nonprofits 
despite their supposed goal alignment with the public sector. Nonprofits, however, are clearly 
distinguished from governmental and for-profit contractors in terms of their strong community 
ties and measuring difficulties related to the types of services they deliver. Nonprofits are further 
separated from for-profits and public vendors in terms of higher levels of asset-specificity and 
tend to have more limited vendor markets than their for-profit peers. Interestingly, principal 
governments do not seem to differentiate the sectors at all when deciding how frequently they 
coordinate with their vendors or how strictly they enforce formal sanction clauses toward non-
compliant or nonperforming vendors. Government and for-profit vendors share some other con-
tracting characteristics as well. For example, there appears to be only an insignificant gap 
between these two types of vendors in terms of service measurability and market characteristics 
and citizen interest, suggesting that local governments tend to use public as well as for-profit 
markets to deliver a variety of hard services that affect residents’ daily lives.




Dependent variable by category
 For-profit 0.636 0.482 0.000 1.000
 Nonprofit 0.269 0.444 0.000 1.000
 Other government 0.096 0.294 0.000 1.000
Variables of Interest
 Trust 3.791 1.073 1.000 5.000
 Community ties 3.612 1.225 1.000 5.000
 Measurement difficulty 4.566 2.178 2.000 10.000
 Asset specificity 3.135 0.529 2.140 4.220
 Few vendors 3.518 1.372 1.000 5.000
 Citizen Interest 3.076 0.514 1.500 4.000
 Contract features 7.549 3.487 3.000 15.000
 Contracts and coordination 3.975 1.082 1.000 5.000
 Use of discretion in sanctioning 3.143 1.163 1.000 5.000
Controls
 Professional administrator 0.737 0.441 0.000 1.000
 Population 2008 0.240 0.809 0.025 9.862
 County 0.490 0.501 0.000 1.000
 Performance 3.888 0.746 2.000 5.000
N = 335  
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Turning to specifics, we see in Table 2 that the Trust related hypotheses are only partially sup-
ported. Contrary to expectations Trust is not particularly helpful in differentiating between non-
profit and for-profit contractors. Only other government vendors are perceived to be more 
trustworthy than the other two types of contract agents (b = 0.684, p= 0.049 for the comparison 
with for-profits and b = 0.558, p = 0.092 with nonprofits) and for-profits and nonprofits are sta-
tistically indistinguishable on the dimension (b = 0.126, p= 0.580). The substantive impact of this 
variable is notable (see Table 3). A one unit increase in trust increases the probability of the 
vendor being identified as another government by 8.1 percentage points, which represents a 
73.4% increase in the probability of the vendor being of such status.9,10
As expected, nonprofits are clearly separated from the other two vendor types in terms of 
Community ties and Measurement difficulty. Nonprofits are considered notably more connected 
to their communities than either for-profits or other governments (b = 1.314, p = 0.000 and 
b = –0.700, p = 0.004, respectively). And the impact of this variable is also sizable—a one unit 
increase in community ties is associated with a 27.8 percentage point (or 105.6%) increase in the 
probability that the vendor is a nonprofit, which makes this measure one of the most dominant 
indicators of nonprofit status in the model. Although community ties appear to a strong differen-
tiator between government and for-profit vendors, Table 3 indicates that the impact of this vari-
able on other government status is fairly meager. Another prevailing indicator for predicting 
Table 2. What Differentiates the Vendor Types?
Independent variables
For-profit (as reference) 
versus nonprofit
For-profit (as reference) 
versus other government
Nonprofit (as reference) 
versus other government
Variables of interest b sea b se b se
 Trust (+)b 0.126 0.228 (+) 0.684** 0.348 (+) 0.558* 0.331
 Community ties (+) 1.314*** 0.203 (+/–) 0.614*** 0.209 (–) –0.700*** 0.244
  Measurement 
 difficulty
(+) 0.300*** 0.099 (+) 0.062 0.111 (–) –0.238** 0.112
 Asset specificity (+) 2.596*** 0.514 (+) 1.662*** 0.584 (–) –0.935* 0.554
 Few vendors (+) 0.448** 0.186 (+) 0.290 0.224 (+/–) –0.158 0.249
 Citizen interest (+) 1.814*** 0.392 (+) –0.649 0.515 (+/–) 1.165** 0.552
 Contract features (+) 0.041 0.071 (+) 0.314*** 0.087 (+) 0.273*** 0.086
  Contacts and 
 coordination
(–) 0.099 0.177 (–) –0.182 0.193 (–) –0.280 0.194
  Use of discretion  
 in sanctioning
(+) –0.065 0.189 (+) 0.019 0.224 (+) 0.084 0.216
Controls
  Professional 
 administrator
0.483 0.495 (+) –0.179 0.529 (+) –0.661 0.577
 Population 2008 0.378*** 0.130 (+) –0.533 1.041 (+) –0.911 1.034
 County –0.156 0.377 (+) –0.861* 0.464 (+) –0.705 0.474
 Performance –0.122 0.332 (+) –0.064 0.356 (+) 0.058 0.357
 Constant –12.961*** 2.196 (+) –12.736*** 2.569 (+) 0.224 2.655
N = 335 cases/248 jurisdictions
χ2 = 126.84***
aRobust standard errors clustered on jurisdiction (see White 1980).
bHypothesized direction of relationship.
*p < 0.10. **p < 0.05. ***p < 0.01 (two-tailed).
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Table 3. Impacts for Statistically Significant Variables.
Independent variables New probability ∆ probability % ∆ probability
Variables of interest
 Trust
 For-profit 0.548 –0.079 –12.556
 Nonprofit 0.261 –0.002 –0.794
 Other government 0.191 0.081 73.369
 Community ties
 For-profit 0.346 –0.280 –44.761
 Nonprofit 0.541 0.278 105.629
 Other government 0.112 0.002 2.100
 Measurement difficulty
 For-profit 0.498 –0.129 –20.581
 Nonprofit 0.402 0.139 52.745
 Other government 0.100 –0.010 –9.025
 Asset specificity
 For-profit 0.324 –0.303 –48.314
 Nonprofit 0.539 0.276 104.637
 Other government 0.137 0.027 24.697
 Few vendors
 For-profit 0.528 –0.098 –15.677
 Nonprofit 0.348 0.084 32.000
 Other government 0.124 0.014 12.683
 Citizen interest
 For-profit 0.774 0.148 23.596
 Nonprofit 0.128 –0.135 –51.358
 Other government 0.097 –0.013 –11.456
 Contract features
 For-profit 0.498 –0.129 –20.583
 Nonprofit 0.241 –0.022 –8.339
 Other government 0.261 0.151 137.109
 Contacts and coordination
 For-profit 0.621 –0.006 –0.897
 Nonprofit 0.288 0.025 9.386
 Other government 0.091 –0.019 –17.347
Controls
 Population 2008
 For-profit 0.594 –0.033 –5.260
 Nonprofit 0.339 0.075 28.595
  Other government 0.068 –0.042 –38.466
 County
 For-profit 0.697 0.071 11.293
 Nonprofit 0.251 –0.012 –4.746
 Other government 0.052 –0.058 –52.931
Note: “Impact” is calculated as follows: A baseline probability is determined for each dependent variable category by setting 
the 5-point variables at their median values, quasi-continuous variables at their means, and the dummies such that each case 
represents a city (as opposed to county) with a council-manager form of government. This leads to baseline probabilities of 
p
fp
 = 0.627, p
np
 = 0.263, and p
og
 = 0.110, which compare favorably with the true probabilities in the dataset (p
fp
 = 0.636,  
p
np
 = 0.269, p
og
 = 0.096). Each variable, in turn, is then increased in value (dummies and 5-points by one increment and quasi-
continuous by one standard deviation), while holding all other variables constant, and new probabilities are calculated. The 
appropriate comparisons are then made between the new and baseline probabilities.
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nonprofit status is the measurement difficulties associated with the services vendors deliver. 
Nonprofits are clearly distinguished from other governments and for-profits (b = –0.238, 
p = 0.033 and b = 0.300, p= 0.002, respectively) on this metric—they are preferred for the pro-
duction of difficult-to-evaluate services. Other governments and for-profits are indistinguishable 
in this regard. Considering that the majority of nonprofit vendors are human service agencies and 
human services are in general more challenging to assess in terms of determining quality and 
effectiveness, this finding makes sense. Other governments, on the other hand, deliver a more 
even mix of soft (e.g., public health, mental health, elderly services, etc.) and hard (e.g., bus 
systems, water distribution, sewage treatment, etc.) services in our sample.
Asset specificity also significantly differentiates between the sectors. Nonprofits are associ-
ated with the highest levels of asset specificity likely owing to their tendency to deliver asset-
specific, customized services to niche populations. However, for-profits are associated with the 
lowest levels of asset specificity. The substantive impact of this variable is also impressive with 
a one unit increase associated with a 104.6% increase in the likelihood the vendor is a nonprofit 
and a 48.3% decrease in the probability it is a for-profit.
Our market measure, Few vendors, is only helpful in distinguishing between for-profit and 
nonprofit vendors. Nonprofits, not surprisingly, tend to compete in less robust markets. However, 
the impact of this variable is rather moderate with the largest result being a 32% increase in the 
likelihood of the vendor being a nonprofit when this variable is increased by one unit.
Although Citizen interest is helpful in identifying vendor ownership, the findings do not con-
form to expectations. Contracting governments are not statistically more likely to choose public 
contractors over for-profits (b = –0.649, p = 0.207). Furthermore, they appear to eschew nonprof-
its when dealing with high interest services, contrary to our hypothesis (b = –1.814, p = 0.000). 
Both for-profits and other government contractors are likely vendors in such instances. The sub-
stantive impact of this variable appears to be relatively moderate—a one unit increase is associ-
ated with a 23.6% increase in the likelihood of identifying the vendor as for-profit and about a 
51.4% decrease in the probability that the vendor is a nonprofit.
As for the three contract management variables (Contract features, Contacts and coordina-
tion, and Use of discretion in sanctioning), nonprofit and for-profit vendors are not statistically 
separated on any of these aspects. Taken together, along with the findings about Trust, these 
results suggest that local contracting practices do not conform to the stereotypical expectations 
pertaining to vendor ownership. Public managers treat nonprofit and for-profit contractors virtu-
ally identically in terms of how formally they write contracts or how frequently they interact with 
vendors during contract execution and monitoring. Moreover, local managers do not take any of 
the sectors into consideration when it comes to enforcing sanctions and deciding how much dis-
cretion to exercise before invoking penalties if noncompliance occurs. Again, this goes against 
the theoretical expectation that for-profit vendors will be subject to stricter and more market-like 
discipline than nonprofit and public organizations.
Meanwhile, local jurisdictions seem to regard public vendors as considerably different from 
the other sectors in terms of preparing written contracts (Contract features: b = 0.314, p = 0.000 
and b = 0.273, p = 0.002 for the for-profit and nonprofit comparisons, respectively). When con-
tracting with other governments, for example, governments seem to be only minimally cautious 
in that contract terms are generally ambiguous, lacking in specific task definitions and/or sanc-
tion clauses. Substantively speaking, this is arguably the most influential variable in the model. 
Increasing Contract features by one standard deviation raises the likelihood of the vendor being 
“other government” by 15.1 percentage points, or over 137% from the baseline. This could be 
associated with the fact that fellow governments appear to be more trusted than the other sectors 
because of shared institutional identities and familiarity. As such, there is less need for heavy 
doses of legalism in contract documents, as it is assumed the vendor knows what needs to be 
done and can be expected to fulfill its obligations of its own accord.
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Finally, turning to our control variables, there is not a lot going on. Larger jurisdictions, as 
measured by population size, are more likely to employ nonprofit vendors as opposed to for-
profits, which makes sense as such jurisdictions tend to be the ones most commonly providing 
social services, which in turn, are closely associated with the nonprofit sector. The only other 
control reaching even marginal levels of significance is County in the for-profit versus other 
government comparison. The coefficient is negative (b = –0.861, p = 0.064), indicating that 
county governments are less likely than municipalities to use other government as compared 
with for-profit contractors. This lends support to our assertion that much intergovernmental con-
tracting is of the form of municipalities contracting with county governments to achieve econo-
mies of scale. Interestingly, there is no evidence that any of the sectors are advantaged in 
Performance—none of the coefficients are statistically distinguishable from zero. This goes 
against the arguments of both market advocates such as Savas (2000), who claim the profit 
motive should trigger superior performance, and those who claim nonprofits may excel in quality 
service delivery. Generally speaking, the contracting governments in our sample are fairly satis-
fied with their vendors across the board. For-profits and nonprofits each averaged around 3.9 on 
this 5-point, ordered scale, while other governments averaged 4.1.
Conclusions and Implications
The main purpose of this study is to comprehensively investigate the vendor ownership-related 
contracting characteristics identified in the literature. Our findings call for a careful reexamina-
tion of the conventional understanding as to the exact role vendor ownership plays in local 
contracting practice. In our sample, the factors that differentiate the sectors from one another are 
multidimensional in nature and do not neatly coincide with existing theoretical expectations. For 
instance, local governments do not regard their nonprofit partners as particularly more trustwor-
thy than for-profit vendors nor appear to manage them in divergent manners simply based on 
sectoral affiliation, which may indicate that local managers are pragmatic (Hefetz & Warner, 
2012) and perhaps “smart buyers” (Kettl, 1993) who “avoid the sector-related stereotypes” 
(Amirkhanyan, 2010, p. 750). This does not mean that governments do not see them differently. 
In fact, they conceive of nonprofits as being much closer to their communities, which could 
explain the heavy use of this type of vendor for the delivery of community-based human ser-
vices. Local governments also recognize difficulties and challenges associated with evaluating 
the quality of human services that nonprofits typically deliver (see Smith Lipsky, 1993 for 
related discussions) and the often limited and semi-monopolistic nature of the markets in which 
they operate. What is interesting, however, is that governments’ apparent awareness about these 
tenets has little to do with how much they trust their vendors. This seeming disconnect between 
the transaction cost natures of services and underlying trust issues is important because it raises 
questions as to the validity of the sector-based trustworthiness proposition frequently adopted in 
the literature to explain vendor selection or other contract management behaviors. A number of 
scholars raise similar concerns on this matter and call for a careful examination of the underlying 
motives and associated behaviors of nonprofits in contracting (Amirkhanyan, 2010; Brooks, 
2005; Heinrich, 2000; Van Slyke, 2003; Weisbrod, 1988).
Although the findings regarding governmental service providers require caution in their interpre-
tations and implications because of the small number of such vendors (32) found in this study, the 
largely hands-off ex ante control mechanism (i.e., written contract features) adopted for these types 
of vendors is noteworthy. The existing literature would argue that a high level of goal congruence 
between principal and agent governments enables public managers to adopt laissez-faire approaches 
toward public contractors, yet the same mission alignment assumption does not yield an identical 
effect on managing nonprofits in our sample. Recent studies exploring government-to-government 
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contracting suggest a broader and more complex set of commonalities that governments might share 
with their other government contractors, but not so much with private, nonprofit organizations, such 
as political and administrative accountability structures, internal monitoring procedures, and perfor-
mance measures (Brown, 2008; Marvel & Marvel, 2007; Warner & Hefetz, 2002). Perhaps, this 
finding highlights our need to reexamine the role of the goal congruence dimension as it does not 
sufficiently differentiate the sectors and does not effectively assist us in explaining what manage-
ment strategies public managers adopt toward each vendor type and why.
In conclusion, future research should expand the scope of its inquiries about vendor owner-
ship beyond the goal congruence-trust assumptions mainly derived from the sectors’ legal and 
organizational constraints. Scholars must investigate a broader range of service, organizational, 
political, and technological factors and take them into consideration when examining what really 
matters in building trusting relationships or developing effective strategies to manage vendors. 
For example, whether for-profit vendors have previously earned positive reputations or nonprof-
its are accredited by credible agencies and/or have sufficient service and financial capacities 
might be more important than their ownership status, per se, regarding whether to rely on these 
service providers. The content of monitoring and, to a degree, its intensity might be determined 
by the technological complexities and measuring difficulties associated with the services rather 
than vendors’ sectoral affiliations. This does not mean that sectors do not matter. Rather, we 
simply call for more comprehensive and refined research on the role played by vendor 
ownership.
Appendix A
List of Services Included in the Analyses
Hard services Soft services
• Residential solid waste collection
• Solid waste disposal
• Tree trimming and planting on public rights of way
• Street repair
• Animal control/shelter
• Operation of parking lots and garages
• Traffic sign/signal installation/maintenance
• Commercial solid waste collection
• Street/parking lot cleaning
• Operation/maintenance of bus transit system
• Recycling
• Operation/maintenance of paratransit system
• Sewage collection and treatment
• Snow plowing/sanding
• Parking meter maintenance and collection




• Disposal of hazardous materials
•  Operation of mental health/mental retardation 
programs and facilities
• Program for the elderly
• Drug and alcohol treatment program
• Public health program
• Workforce development/job training program
• Child welfare program
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Appendix B
Measures Used in the Analysis
Vendor type Three-point categorical measure which identifies
 (a) “For-profits”
 (b) “Nonprofits”
 (c) “Other governments”
Trust A 5-point ordinal scale with 1 indicating “if not watched, it would not be surprising 
for this vendor to cut corners” and 5 indicating “we trust this vendor to fulfill its 
obligations even when it is not being watched.”
Community  
ties
A 5-point ordinal scale with 1 indicating “this vendor does not have strong ties to our 
community” and 5 indicating “this vendor has strong ties to our community.”
Measurement 
difficulty
An additive scale consisting of two 5-point ordinal indicators, thus the variable ranges 
from 2 to 10 (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.798), such that
 (a)  For the first variable, 1 indicates “tasks are standardized and easily defined” and 5 
indicating “tasks require customization and are not easy to define.”
 (b)  For the second variable, 1 indicates “performance and service quality are easy to 
measure” and 5 indicating “performance is hard to measure and service quality is 
hard to determine.”
Asset specificity Brown and Potoski’s (2003a) 5-point scale with 1 indicating the lowest levels of asset 
specificity and 5 the highest (see the appendix in their study for detailed information 
regarding the measurement of the variable).
Few vendors A 5-point ordinal scale with 1 indicating “there are many vendors available in the market 
to replace the incumbent” and 5 indicating “there are very few vendors in the market 
to replace the incumbent.”
Citizen interest This measure is borrowed from Hefetz and Warner (2012, p. 309). A 5-point ordinal scale 
with 1 indicating “low” and 5 “high” on the following statement to local public managers: 
“For many services, the public is not interested in how the service is delivered, just that it is 
timely and of good quality. But for some services the public has a high degree of interest in 
the process of service delivery and opportunities for participation must be preserved.”
Contract  
features
An additive scale consisting of three 5-point ordinal indicators, thus the variable ranges 
from 3 to 15 (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.753), such that
 (a)  For the first variable, 1 indicates “contract is rebid regularly, regardless of incumbent 
performance” and 5 indicates “contract is not rebid unless incumbent discontinues 
service or has serious problems.”
 (b)  For the second variable, 1 indicates “contract explicitly spells out deliverables, performance 
measures, and reporting requirements” and 5 indicates “contract does not cover detailed 
requirements, but contract terms and obligations are mutually understood.”
 (c)  For the third variable, 1 indicates “contract explicitly lays out sanction clauses that 
contain specific and detailed penalties” and 5 indicates “contract does not have 
explicit sanction clauses that detail penalties.”
Contacts and 
coordination
A 5-point ordinal scale with 1 indicating “contacts and coordination with the vendor are 
rare during contract implementation” and 5 indicating “contacts and coordination with 
the vendor are very common during contract implementation.”
Use of  
discretion  
in sanctioning
A 5-point ordinal scale with 1 indicating “sanctions are imposed as written in the 
contract with little discretion or negotiation” and 5 indicating “negotiation often takes 
place without formal sanctioning and contract terms may be altered as a result.”
Professional 
administrator
A dichotomous variable that scores 1 for council-manager (cities) and council-
administrator (counties) forms of government.
Population 2008 U.S. census population estimates (transformed to millions so variable scales are 
compatible).
County A dichotomous variable that scores 1 for county government and 0 otherwise.
Performance A 5-point ordinal scale with 1 indicating “this vendor has been performing very much 
below expectations” and 5 indicating “this vendor has been performing very much 
above expectations.”
Note: The 5-point scales referenced above represent the actual questions posed to the respondents. For each service 
for which they responded, they were asked to mark on a number line what they felt to be the appropriate answer 
ranging between the “1” and “5” options listed above.
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Appendix C
Comparison of Characteristics of the Municipalities in the Sample With the 
UnitedStates, Overall ICMA List, and Requested ICMA Lista
Characteristic United States (%)
Overall ICMA  
list / (%)
Requested ICMA 
list / (%) Sample (%)
Population  
 Less than 10,000 86.6a 54.7 0.0 0.0
 10,000 to 49,999 10.4 36.2 28.1 21.1
 50,000 to 249,999 2.6 8.2 64.5 73.7
 250,000 or greater 0.3 0.9 7.4 5.3
Region  
 Northeast 13.2b 21.1c 19.6 13.5
 North Central 32.5 30.8 24.6 20.5
 South 35.8 33.5 25.1 29.8
 West 18.5 14.7 30.7 36.3
Metro Status  
 Central d d 43.7 40.9
 Suburban d d 51.4 55.0
 Independent d d 5.0 4.1
Form of Government  
 Mayor-Council d d 34.7 17.5
 Council-Manager d d 62.6 81.3
 Commission d d 1.6 1.2
 Town Meeting d d 1.1 0.0
 (N = 35,933) (N = 7,231) (N = 925) (N = 128)
aInformation on U.S. jurisdictions were available only for municipalities and not counties. Therefore, we dropped counties 
from our comparison. The municipality/county breakdown for each of the categories is as follows: U.S.—35,933/3034 
(U.S. Census Bureau 2002); ICMA List (Overall)—7,231/3039 (ICMA’s academic researcher’s order form, available from 
ICMA); ICMA list (Requested)—925/1075 (authors’ calculations); Sample—128/120 (authors’ calculations).
bESRI (2003).
cThe ICMA order sheet did not break down region by municipalities and counties, so the numbers reported here are 
for the aggregate.
dNot available.
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Notes
1. The author later qualifies this by pointing out that there may be a bias toward such responses as it is 
important for public managers to avoid showing favoritism in their vendor relations.
 2. We originally sent the surveys directly to individuals named as the “chief administrative officer” for the 
jurisdiction in question, as listed in the ICMA contact list. This was not an effective strategy and in the 
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follow-up mailings, we sent packets to the generic title “chief administrative officer” (CAO). This 
improved our response rate. In the cover letter, we asked the CAOs to fill out our surveys or forward 
them to appropriate persons if they felt they were unable/unqualified to fill them out themselves. We also 
requested identifier information from the respondents. About one-quarter of respondents refused to 
identify themselves, but for the 200 we have information for, after grouping the myriad reported job titles 
into four distinct categories, we find that 115 (57.5%) are city or county managers, their deputies, or 
work directly in their offices; 74 (37.0%) are department heads, their deputies, or staff; seven (3.5%) are 
elected officials or their staff; and four (2.0%) are city/county clerks.
 3.  Respondents were specifically asked to mark a number line running from 1 to 5, which allowed some 
to choose midrange values, such as 3.5. Such choices were not overly common and only accounted 
for about 3% of responses for the questions included in the analysis. Also, the only midrange options 
marked were midpoints. Therefore, our 5-point scales actually contain up to nine ordered response 
categories.
 4.  Our response rate is lower than preferred, but as outlined above, every effort was made to increase it. 
We suspect our survey was, to some extent, a victim of the current economic climate in which local 
governments are dealing with unprecedented budget shortfalls leading to difficulty in maintaining 
staffing levels, among other issues, that might make it more difficult/unlikely they would have the 
resources or be willing to make an effort to fill out our survey. That said, our rate compares favorably 
with some recent research in this area (e.g., Hefetz & Warner’s [2012] rate is 7.5%). And, the number 
of unique jurisdictions included in our sample also fairs well (e.g., N = 167 for Hefetz & Warner 
[2012] and N = 137 for Marvel & Marvel [2007]).
 5.  It should be noted that although we have no definitive information on the distribution of forms of 
governments in the United States, the requested ICMA list likely also has a disproportionately large 
number of council-manager jurisdictions. For example, ICMA’s most recent municipal (2006) and 
county (2007) form of government surveys found 54.5% and 29.6% council-manager governments, 
respectively.
 6. Readers interested in more information on this model are directed to Long (1997).
 7. Hausman tests for IIA are indeterminant. A series of Hausman-like tests conducted using the “suest” 
command in Stata 10.1 shows that no parameter estimates are significantly affected, at conventional 
levels, when the models are rerun with suppressed dependent variable categories. As the efficacy of 
such tests has been cast into doubt (Cheng & Long, 2007), we also ran the model as a multinomial 
probit as a check. The results are identical regarding statistical inference. There are also no notable 
differences in the predicted probabilities generated by the competing models. Since recent research 
(Kropko, 2008) indicates that multinomial logit may be the more robust model, even in the face of 
severe IIA, we choose to report the multinomial logit results. Interested readers can contact the 
authors for more information.
 8.  That is, the null model correctly predicts 63.6% of the cases. Our model correctly predicts 80.3% of 
cases. The proportional reduction in error is then ([80.3—63.6] / 63.6) × 100 = 26.3.
 9. It is important to point out that the baseline probability of observing another government vendor is 
somewhat small, 11.0%, which means that fairly small percentage point changes can lead to rather 
dramatic changes in overall probability.
10.  See the note at the bottom of Table 3 for an explanation of how the impacts are calculated.
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